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Kari H Eika 
 
Consumers of human services: powerless 





Consumer choice in social care may worsen quality at the low end of the quality scale. Many 
social care recipients are not consumer sovereign; they depend on others to safeguard their 
interests, but their representation may be weak. U.S. and Norwegian data on nursing home 
patients‘ complaint behaviour and family network substantiate this claim. A Schelling diagram 
shows how residents‘ dependency  – when only some individuals have representatives who 
search for good homes and monitor care – increases (decreases) the proportion of residents with 
committed representatives monitoring care in high (low) quality homes. Though choice is 
important as an individual right, public supervision is necessary to protect vulnerable consumers.  
 
JEL classificatiom:    I11 
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1. Introduction 
The economic literature on social care predominantly views well-functioning markets as central 
to improving quality (see, e.g., the review by Norton, 2000). Consumers‘ free choice of provider 
promotes competition and thereby enhances quality. Competitive forces may work even when 
nursing home residents are funded by third parties. Public funding is common in many Western 
countries, including the USA, where 78 percent of residents have public funds as their primary 
source of support (Harrington, Carrilo and Blank, 2008). 
Following the introduction of quasi-markets (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993), consumer 
choice has become a tool to improve quality and efficiency of service in modern welfare states as 
well. Rothstein (1998) and other scholars see consumer choice as a way to make welfare states 
responsive to individual needs and preferences, and to increase public accountability and 
democratic control from below by giving decision rights to those who benefit from and 
experience the service. 
Although there are strong reasons to secure decision rights for highly vulnerable 
individuals who depend on social care, this paper argues that consumer choice alone cannot be 
relied on to secure quality. 
The vulnerability of social care recipients is recognised in economic research. The critical 
question, however, is how formal economic reasoning should take this vulnerability into account. 
Following Arrow (1963), the common approach in health economics is to assume that patients 
are susceptible to opportunistic behaviour by the provider because they lack information to 
assess quality. Arrow‘s classic article discusses medical care in general and the patient–physician 
relationship in particular. In this health care context, the main cause of information asymmetries 
is the need for specialised knowledge. Because of a doctor‘s medical training, he or she is in a 
better position to evaluate medical quality than a lay patient. The assumption of asymmetrically 
distributed information then reflects a specific incompetence of the patient, the lack of medical 
expertise (Arrow, 1963, 1996). 
In social care, the asymmetric information assumption in fact accounts for service 
recipients‘ general incapacity (see, e.g., Hirth, 1999; Chou, 2002; Grabowski and Hirth, 2003; Hirth 
et al., 2003). In this literature, which focuses on nursing homes, the information asymmetry 
assumption is not adopted in the same way by all authors. In Hirth‘s (1999) study, the relatives 
who monitor care on behalf of residents have less information about quality than the provider. In 
Chou (2002), only residents without involved relatives in this sense have inferior information. 
Both approaches raise the question: why do residents have to rely on family? The obvious 
answer is that residents may not have the personal capacity to monitor care. People move into 
nursing homes because they have lost some or all of their ability to care for themselves (Kane 
and Kane, 1988). For the same reasons—cognitive impairments, depression, physical illness or 
age fragility—residents may be unable to respond to poor quality by seeking alternative sources 
of care or complaining, or they may choose not to exercise exit and voice options because they 
are socially dependent on their care givers. My point here is that a loss of basic general skills has 
other and more profound implications for consumer behaviour than those that result from 
incomplete knowledge about quality. 
Many nursing home residents are not autonomous consumers. Instead, they have limited 
consumer sovereignty, meaning limited ability to form consistent preferences or limited ability or 
authority to make available choices to maximise utility (Eika 2009). In my use of the term ‗limited 
consumer sovereignty‘, I follow Thurow (1974), who views limited consumer sovereignty as 
limited decision-making competence
1.
 Limited consumer sovereignty implies a dual dependency 
                                                 
1 Thurow (1974) does not make a distinction between competence and limited consumer sovereignty. While 
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on others. Service recipients depend on providers for care, and on friends, family or guardians to 
assist or represent them as consumers. To understand the logic of social care markets, these 
dependencies must clearly be taken into account. 
Although the paper focuses on nursing homes, the discussion is relevant for a number of 
human services. Limited consumer sovereignty is a pervasive phenomenon; frail and sick elderly, 
individuals with intellectual disabilites, individuals with severe psychiatric problems and minors 
depend to varying degrees on representation to safeguard their interests. These groups also tend 
to be major consumers of human services, i.e. health and social care, and education. 
There are few empirical investigations of consumer behaviour in nursing home markets. 
Two US studies are Nyman (1989), who estimates a demand function for private paying 
residents, and Hirth et al. (2003), who examine transfers. Nyman (1989, p. 210) articulates claims 
about nursing home markets that are often not clearly stated. First, even if some residents have 
cognitive difficulties, ‗those who do not represent a sizeable proportion of residents‘ and may 
therefore (approximately) act as autonomous utility-maximising consumers. Second, residents 
often have representatives (‗agents‘) who are likely to be both rational and well informed. Third, 
‗[s]ince it is not necessary for all residents to be rational for firms to fear the consequences of 
providing low quality and charging high prices, the existence of this group may provide a 
sufficient amount of rationality to discipline the market‘. The last claim is similar to that of Hirth 
et al. (2003, p. 344), who argue that ‗[a] precondition for the success of pro-competitive policies is 
the existence of at least some fraction of consumers […] who make well-informed choices and 
reevaluate those choices over time.‘ 
This paper questions all three of these claims. The latter is an assertion about the 
functioning of social care markets, which is the main issue I wish to address. My argument is 
theoretical but simple. If the degree of representation differs between residents, the 
uncoordinated decisions by residents or their agents result in an outcome that policy makers may 
judge undesirable. Increased quality differences between homes, and worsened quality in homes 
that from the outset were of the lowest quality, are possible scenarios. 
Because the argument is premised on the assumption that nursing home residents depend 
on others to safeguard their interests as consumers, I first present data from the USA and 
Norway to illustrate this dependence and its immediate implications for residents‘ opportunity 
for agency (Section 2). Section 3 uses a Schelling diagram to show effects of inadequate 
representation on market outcomes. The final section discusses implications of residents‘ limited 
consumer sovereignty for policy and for interpretation of the empirical findings of previous 
research on consumer behaviour in nursing home markets. 
 
2. The nursing home population 
People rarely move to a nursing home until they have become very ill. Most people wish to be 
cared for in their own homes as long as it is feasible. Moreover, institutional care such as nursing 
home care is expensive, and eligibility criteria for non-paying individuals to enter a nursing facility 
may be strict. 
A large majority of nursing home residents in the USA have mental disorders. About 46 
per cent have a formal dementia diagnosis, and 21 per cent have another psychological diagnosis 
(Harrington, Carillo and Blank, 2008). Dementia may destroy decision-making competence even 
at an early stage of the disease. Short-term memory loss, which is an early symptom, makes it 
difficult to remember facts such as the information necessary to compare the quality of different 
nursing homes. Depression is not a cognitive impairment; a depressed person may know what is 
in his or her interest but does not care to act in accordance with it. 
The prevalence of dementia and other mental disorders may be considerably higher than 
the percentage of residents with formal diagnoses. A UK study found dementia in 90 per cent of 
nursing home residents (Margallo-Lana et al., 2001), while close to 80 per cent of residents in a 4                                                                                                      Kari Eika 
sample of Sydney nursing homes had severe cognitive impairments (Brodaty et al., 2001). In 
Norway, 80 per cent of a representative sample of residents had dementia, while, consistent with 
the US findings, only 45 per cent had received a formal diagnosis (Selbæk, Kirkevold and 
Engedal., 2007). 
 
2.1 Consumer behaviour 
Hirschman (1970) divides possible consumer responses to poor quality into two categories. A 
consumer may use either an ‗exit‘ option (i.e., change provider or exit the service) or a ‗voice‘ 
option (i.e., any action to improve service quality other than termination of the service 
relationship). 
I first examine nursing home residents‘ use of the voice option. In the USA, federal law 
requires every state to have an ombudsman program to advocate for social care recipients. 
Ombudsmen visit nursing homes and speak with residents, relatives, staff, management and 
others concerned. Table 1 displays complaints registered by ombudsmen and complaints filed 
with the state survey agency (the regulatory authority) in California in 2007. In that year, 
ombudsman representatives visited 90 per cent of all Californian homes at least quarterly 
(Administration on Aging, 2007). 
 
Table 1. Number of cases registered with the ombudsman or state authority in nursing homes in 
California in 2007. 
Type of complainant  Ombudsman*  State authority 
  number   %  number  % 
Resident  6,922  26  769  12 
Relative, friend  3,700  14  2,538  39 
Ombudsman, ombudsman volunteer  4,445  17  1,007  15 
Other  11,072  42  2,251  34 
Total  26,139  100  6,565  100 
* All cases concluded in 2007 are counted. 
Source: Administration on Aging, and Centres for Medicare and Medicaid Service, OSCAR database. 
 
A characteristic of social care is the low frequency of complaints from the service recipients 
themselves. To file a complaint to the ombudsman is easy. Complaints may be informal and need 
not be substantiated by the complainant. In table 1 only one out of four complaints was voiced 
by a resident. 
The state survey agency registers far fewer complaints than the ombudsman. Not all 
complaints registered by the latter concerns a legal violation. Complainants may choose not to 
file a complaint if they do not expect state authorities to investigate it, and the ombudsman may 
eliminate some causes of complaints by negotiating with people such as the home‘s management 
or staff. These factors probably in part explain why the total number of complaints to the state 
regulator is only a quarter of the number of cases registered by the ombudsman. 
The state receives about 90 per cent fewer complaints from residents than the 
ombudsman, and only about 30 per cent fewer complaints from family and friends. The 
requirement to call or send a written statement by mail or email to that authority may be a greater 
obstacle to residents than to more able groups. Furthermore, in cases of serious legal violations 
about which the state authority should be notified, the resident is often too compromised or too 
incapacitated to file a complaint personally. The resident must then rely on a friend or relative to 
act as a representative. Only 12 per cent of all complaints to the state authority are filed by a 
resident. In reality, the figure may be substantially lower. Complaints may be initiated and written 
by representatives and signed by the resident. 
   Consumers of human services: powerless or poorly informed?  5 
   
Table 2. Number of cases reported to the Health and Social Care Ombudsman in Oslo (%). 1 
January 2004–30 June 2005. (Gynaecology/birth: 1 January–30 June 2005.) 
Ombudsman contacted by  Nursing home  Surgery  Gynaecology/birth 
  %  %  % 
1. Patient  0  65  67 
2. Patient and helper       
        Family  0  3  19 
        Others  0  1  0 
3. Representative       
       Family  84  29  15 
       Friends  3  0  0 
       Provider employee  0  0  0 
       External social worker  3  1  0 
       Others  10  1  0 
Total  100  100  100 
(Number of observations)  (31)  (115)  (27) 
Source: Health and Social Care Ombudsman in Oslo. 
 
To illustrate more explicitly the difference between powerless consumers and those poorly 
informed, Table 2 compares complaints from nursing homes with two somatic health care 
services. My claim that nursing home residents and other individuals with comprehensive long-
term incapacities behave fundamentally differently from service recipients without such 
incapacities is general and does not pertain only to the USA. Table 2 is derived from an informal 
log of requests made by the public to the Health and Social Care Ombudsman in Oslo, Norway. 
Unlike the American ombudsman institution, ombudsmen in Norway do not seek out nursing 
home residents by visiting homes to hear their views; individuals must contact the ombudsman‘s 
office. Moreover, because the log is informal—it consists of notes made by the ombudsman‘s 
officers—the log reports the actual complainant; e.g., whether it is the service recipient or a 
representative. Thus the log is a good indicator of the extent to which individuals are able to 
make complaints personally. 
Table 2 categorises all contacts within two somatic health care services 
(gynaecology/birth and surgery) and one social care service (nursing homes) according to 
whether the service recipient contacted the ombudsman in person. There are three categories. In 
the first category are those cases where only the recipient acts (calls, visits or writes to the 
ombudsman), in the second category are cases where both the recipient and a representative 
contact the ombudsman, and in the third are cases where only a representative (relative, friend, 
social worker) makes contact.  
If limited consumer sovereignty is a problem in nursing homes but less so for the two 
other services, clearly fewer cases concerning nursing homes should be expected in the first 
category (the resident contacting the ombudsman unassisted) and many more in the third 
category (contact is only made by a representative) compared with the other two services. Table 2 
confirms these expectations. In surgery and gynaecology/birth, it is usually the patient who 
contacts the ombudsman, unassisted by a representative. In contrast, no nursing home resident 
contacted the ombudsman in that period.
2 The proportion of category 3 cases is 100 per cent for 
nursing homes, and, respectively,  31 and 15 per cent for surgery and gynaecology/birth.
  
These figures suggest that even residents with intact cognitive capacities are reluctant to 
complain. One reason is fear of retaliation; i.e., a conscious or subconscious reaction by staff or 
management to expressions of dissatisfaction. Retaliation may be subtle yet costly to the resident; 
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for instance, a less pleasant atmosphere and staff members who are less willing to comfort and 
support. 
On average, the nursing home population may be somewhat less healthy in Norway than 
in the USA. They are nevertheless comparable with a large majority of American nursing home 
residents, notably those most vulnerable and dependent. 
Neglect and violation of rights to autonomy and choice are common causes of complaint 
to the US ombudsmen (Administration of Aging, 2007). An assumption of poorly informed 
consumers cannot explain such quality problems. They are those of an experience good: 
recipients learn the quality when receiving the service. If dissatisfied, they may exit; e.g., by 
applying for a place in another nursing home. 
Low rates of exit from nursing homes are, however, universally observed. Hirth et al. 
(2003), examining all home-to-home transfers in several US states in the mid 1990s, found an 
average transfer rate of 3.3 per cent per life-year in nursing homes. The rate of transfers induced 
by the resident or a representative is probably even lower. Some of these transfers are from 
hospital-based Medicare facilities, which are not intended for long-term stays. 
Even for residents with representatives, it is not surprising that the exit option is 
infrequently used. First, exit costs tend to be positively correlated with the level of help 
dependency. Care relationships entail wide-ranging relation-specific investments by both 
residents and carers. It takes time to get to know demented nursing home residents, their wants, 
abilities and limitations, and how to handle aggression, confusion or passivity. Residents need 
time to know and trust the people on whom they depend and to become familiar with the 
environment. The cost of discontinuity may be considerable. The cost of the other exit option, to 
move home again, is also higher when individuals are more dependent on help. Second, residents 
often have strong geographical preferences limiting provider choice. They wish to be close to 
home or to family. Third, social care, whether organised through markets or in a bureaucratic 
mode, is often characterised by excess demand (Norton, 2000). One way of rationing demand 
and containing costs for third-party payers, such as the government, is to control nursing home 
capacity. However, this policy may severely restrict consumer choice in practice. 
In summary, residents‘ practical and social dependence on caregivers may make it 
unattractive for residents to exercise agency. In addition, residents may not have the physical 
resources to execute decisions to exit or complain. They may be unable, for instance, to obtain an 
overview of alternative nursing homes and apply for a place, or to file a complaint by phone or 
letter. Cognitive impairments are therefore not the only factor that may inhibit individual agency. 
Limited consumer sovereignty is intrinsically linked to the individual‘s fundamental dependence 
on others for care. 
 
2.2 Representatives 
Individuals with limited consumer sovereignty also depend on individuals to represent their 
interests as care recipients. This dependence is significant for at least three reasons. First, many 
residents do not have relatives, or their relatives do not have the capacity to act as 
representatives. Second, representatives are not usually present in the home, and they know less 
about the service than they would if they were residents themselves. Information problems are 
therefore greater for representatives and other outside monitors. Third, representatives are not 
the primary beneficiary of service quality and may have weak self-centred incentives to safeguard 
the interest of residents. 
Data on the number of residents that have individuals within their social networks willing 
to take on the role as a representative are scarce. Table 3 presents population statistics from 
Norway on elderly citizens‘ close family members. Many elderly survive their partners, and a 
significant proportion of the eldest people (over 80) also survive their children. The percentage 
without living children increases from 13 per cent for citizens in their late 60s and 70s to more Consumers of human services: powerless or poorly informed?  7 
   
than 40 per cent for those over 90.
3 Most of the representatives who contacted the ombudsman 
were children of nursing home residents. In only one case was the ombudsman contacted by the 
spouse of the resident. Partners are often old and weak themselves, and most of the elderly who 
still had partners also had children. 
Table 3. Married and cohabitating individuals in Norway aged 67 years and over, with or without 
children. Percentage of all citizens in the respective age group. 1 January 2005. 
  67–79  80–89  90+ 
  %  %  % 
1. No children , no partner  9  19  39 
2. No children, with partner   4  4  3 
3. No children in county, no partner   13  25  46 
4. No children in county, with partner  9  8  4 
5. Children outside county, no partner  4  6  7 
6. Children in county, no partner  28  42  43 
No children (sum row 1 and 2)  13  23  42 
No partner (sum row 1, 5 and 6)  41  67  89 
Figures computed from population statistics by Statistics Norway on request. 
To act as a representative monitoring the care of the resident, proximity to the nursing home is 
important. In Table 3, a measure of proximity is whether the representatives live in the same 
county (the Norwegian term is fylke). According to that measure, quite a few elderly do not have 
children nearby, especially among the oldest elderly. A third of the citizens in their 80s and half of 
the citizens over 90 do not have children nearby (sum of row 3 and 4).
4 The figures are probably 
the most informative about the number of nursing home residents without close family to 
represent them. They are comparable with the exact figures in Romøren‘s 2001 longitudinal study 
of the entire elderly population (over 80 in 1982) in a medium-sized Norwegian city, Larvik. At 
the time of death, 42 per cent of the elderly had no children within a half-hour travel distance. 
For the elderly, dependency is inversely related to the size of the family network. That network is 
smaller among the oldest people, while their dependency on help and the use of a nursing home 
is markedly higher. Among the youngest elderly (aged 67-79) in Norway 11 per cent depend on 
social care services (2 per cent as nursing home residents), while 87 per cent of citizens aged 90 
or more are social care recipients (36 per cent as nursing home residents).
5   
If individuals other than family members—e.g., friends or guardians—take on the role of 
personal advocate, the share of residents with a representative may be higher. On the other hand, 
some residents have relatives but none who is willing to act as a representative. 
Evidence for the USA about the involvement of representatives can be derived from 
figures presented by Chou (2002). In his sample of nursing home residents, 42 per cent did not 
have a spouse or child visiting within a month of being admitted to the home. 
 
                                                 
3 Cohort differences in fertility may partly account for differences between age groups. 
4 Within/without the county is a rough measure of proximity. On the other hand, counties are relatively large. My 
guess is that the number of children living outside the county does not overestimate the share of patients with 
children living, say, more than an hour away from their parent. 
5 Statistics Norway (www.ssb.no). Figures are derived from http://www.ssb.no/pleie/tab-2009-07-02-04.html and 
http://www.ssb.no/pleie/tab-2009-07-02-02.html. 8                                                                                                      Kari Eika 
3. Implications for uncoordinated allocation 
An individual with limited consumer sovereignty does not benefit from easier access to 
information, unless he or she has a representative acting on his or her behalf. The mechanisms of 
the market, if uncorrected, may even make their position worse. When presenting the argument, I 
make several simplifying assumptions. These are discussed at the end of the section. 
Imagine a market for nursing home services where the government determines eligibility 
and finances nursing home expenses for all residents. At a certain point in time, there are a given 
number of available nursing home places. The number is at least as high as the number of 
individuals whom the government has deemed to be eligible for a nursing home. 
Homes differ only with respect to quality. Consequently, quality of care is the only matter 
of concern for residents and their representatives. Quality is vertically differentiated; some homes 
are of high quality and others low.
6 
Quality is not directly observable by outsiders; i.e., individuals who are not present in the 
home. There are both hidden information (‗adverse selection‘) and hidden action (‗moral hazard‘) 
problems. The first refers to innate quality differences between homes; homes are either of the 
‗high‘ quality type or the ‗low‘ quality type. In addition, quality within each home depends on the 
level of monitoring by residents or their representatives. The better they monitor care, the smaller 
is the hidden action problem in the home. The presence of involved representatives improves 
psycho-social quality (e.g. whether residents are treated with respect), makes it more likely that 
rooms and hallways are kept clean etc.  
The individuals in need of nursing home care (‗residents‘, for short) cannot search for a 
good home or monitor quality. I also assume that moving costs are so high that exit is not an 
option. 
Residents differ only with respect to whether they have a representative, and the 
characteristics of the representative. There are two groups. In group 1, all residents are without a 
representative. Because the residents cannot act themselves, there must be someone who 
contacts a nursing home on their behalf. That person could be a public employee who randomly 
chooses a home. The choice is not based on information about quality, either because the 
employee does not have the time or does not care to acquire information, or because there are 
anti-discriminatory rules in the government preventing the employee from making quality 
judgments. The latter is relevant when the information that can be acquired is unverifiable; e.g., 
information about a nursing home‘s reputation. 
Group 2 consists of the residents with a personal representative. A representative has two 
functions: finding a home for the resident and monitoring the quality of care once the resident 
has moved in. Searching for a good home is costly. When determining whether to search, a 
representative weighs his or her own personal costs against the gain for the resident. The gain for 
the resident is higher in proportion to the quality difference between good and poor homes. 
Search costs and the weight that representatives attach to the resident‘s gain vary. The higher the 
quality difference, the more representatives are willing to search. 
Group 1 residents cannot make use of information about quality. If information on the 
market is improved, so that searching for a good home becomes easier, there are several 
mechanisms that worsen the position of residents without representatives. First, the search for a 
good home by residents in group 2 (their representatives) may reduce the probability of group 1 
residents finding a good home. Residents with representatives are more likely to find a place in a 
high-quality home than those without representatives. If most high-quality homes have few 
empty beds relative to the number of representatives searching (e.g., only one vacancy), the 
successful search by group 2 representatives also reduces the proportion of high-quality homes 
                                                 
6 Vertical differentiation means that all consumers rank quality in the same way. All prefer a high-quality home to a 
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among homes with vacancies. Because group 1 residents ‗choose‘ a home at random, the 
probability of group 1 residents coming to a high-quality home decreases. In this way, 
representatives‘ searches cause a negative externality affecting group 1 residents. This externality 
is greater when the information about quality that the representatives are able to obtain is more 
accurate. The higher probability of group 1 residents coming to a poor home is problematic 
because hidden action problems are likely to be greater in poor than in good homes. One 
plausible reason why some homes are better than others is that these homes have superior 
professional ethics and work norms. 
Second, quality of care is in important respects collective within each home. Good 
management, highly skilled and motivated workers, strong work norms and a pleasant 
atmosphere improve the quality for all residents. Discriminating between residents on grounds 
other than their care needs and their preferences is also a violation of the ethical code of health 
care professionals. Collective quality is a common assumption in the economic literature on 





















When quality is collective, consumer choice may from a social point of view result in a situation 
which is clearly inferior to one in which residents and nursing homes are randomly matched. The 
mechanisms can be illustrated in a Schelling diagram (Schelling, 1978). The solid line in figure 1 
shows the relationship between the number of representatives actually searching, R, and the 
number of representatives wishing to search, R
W ≡ g(R). In the figure, the curve slopes upwards; 
                                                 
7 Using panel data for nursing home patients, Grabowski et al. (2006) conclude that homes provide approximately 
the same quality to their Medicaid and private-paying patients. McKay (1989) also finds no difference in quality 
between these two patient groups. Although homes may still discriminate along other dimensions—e.g., between 
patients with and without representatives—their findings support the conjecture that there are strong collective 
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i.e., the number of representatives wishing to search increases with the number of representatives 
actually searching for a good home (g‘ > 0). When more representatives search, the number of 
group 2 residents increases in good homes and decreases in poor homes. Therefore the 
monitoring of collective quality improves in good homes and decreases in poor homes. As a 
result, quality differences increase, which in turn make it more attractive for representatives to 
search. The dotted line in the figure (the equality line) is defined by R
W = R; at any point along 
this line the number of representatives wanting to search equals the number of representatives 
that are in fact searching. 
To illustrate the basic mechanisms, the upward sloping curve in Figure 1 crosses the 
equality line from above in point A, and then again from below in point B. According to the 
figure, very committed representatives (a total of R0) always wish to search for a good home. 
Their search increases the quality differences between homes and attracts more representatives to 
search. The number of searchers increases from R0 to  0 R
W . As long as R
W > R (i.e., g(R) lies 
above the equality line), the number of representatives searching induces more representatives to 
search. Thus R increases until the equilibrium point A is reached. At A, the number of 
representatives wishing to search (R
W
A ) equals the number actually searching (RA). A is a stable 
equilibrium. If an external factor results in a moderate increase in R above RA (meaning that R < 
R
*), this increase in the number of representatives searching is not permanent. Because in this 
case R
W < R (i.e., g(R) lies below the equality line), fewer representatives wish to search than the 
number actually searching. Therefore, R decreases until the equilibrium RA is reached. 
In the figure the g(R)-curve has an S-shape to illustrate that multiple equilibria are 
possible. At A, relatively few representatives search, i.e., RA does not greatly exceed 0. Viewing 
consumer choice as a tool for improving market pressure for quality, the authorities may wish to 
encourage more individuals to search for a home of their choice. The authorities could, for 
instance, subsidise the acquisition of information by representatives. Lower search costs reduce 
the hidden information problem, thus shifting the curve upwards, making it attractive for more 
representatives to search. If the positive vertical shift is sufficiently strong, so that no point on 
the curve is below the equality line, all representatives will eventually search for a good home 
(situation C). 
A permanent increase in the number of searchers could also be obtained through a 
temporary policy change; e.g., a public campaign to encourage consumer choice, or a temporary 
reduction in information costs (the government publishes a one-time investigation of nursing 
home quality). If the direct effect is to increase the number of searchers above the critical level R
* 
in the figure, above which R
W > R, the temporary policy results in a permanent increase in the 
number of representatives searching, so that all eventually search (situation C). 
The government may wish to rank A and C. This is not possible using standard welfare 
economic tools such as the Pareto criteria, which only consider differences in individuals‘ utility 
between the two situations. For individuals who are not consumer sovereign, such as demented 
people, individual utility is not in general well defined. However, if a society is particularly 
concerned with the welfare of people in the least favorable circumstances—in this case, residents 
in low-quality homes—it is reasonable to claim that A is preferable to C. More generally, it may 
be claimed that a situation where only a few or no representatives make informed decisions is 
preferable to a rigorous sorting of residents that predominantly places group 2 residents in high-
quality homes. 
Initially (for R = RA), the mix of group 1 and 2 residents may have been such that quality 
was at an acceptable level even in poor homes. There were good homes, and homes not quite as 
good, but no homes of really poor quality. If the sorting of residents intensifies, monitoring in 
low-quality homes may reach a critically low level. If monitoring decreases further, quality 
deteriorates substantially; the composition of workers may change, as highly skilled or committed 
workers wish to leave because high-quality care is not rewarded by the management or monitored 
by representatives. Those with the worst conditions are affected to a greater extent and may Consumers of human services: powerless or poorly informed?  11 
   
experience a much lower quality of care than if the mix of group 1 and 2 residents were more 
balanced. 
The shape of the g(R)-curve is not important for the core argument; i.e., for the adverse 
effects of consumer choice on quality.
8 The key premise is a positive correlation between 
residents‘ (or their representatives‘) willingness to choose a home (in an informed way) and to 
monitor the quality of care in that home. To the extent that quality is collective, there are 
mechanisms in the aggregate that reinforce the negative externalities of the decisions taken by the 
informed regarding the well-being of those unable to safeguard their own interests. 
The placement of the curve is of importance for the extent to which representatives 
choose to make informed choices. An alternative curve is shown in Figure 2. Here no 
representatives wish to search if no one else does. However, if public policies increase the 
number of representatives searching so that R > R












Given the existence of some good and some poor homes (differences in quality not caused by 
differences in resident mix), sorting of residents is socially desirable, but it would be the reverse 
sorting to that observed in the market. Quality in the poorest homes, a particular concern for 
policy makers, would increase. Moreover, if hidden action problems are higher in low-quality 
homes, the potential for improving quality through monitoring is higher in these homes than in 
high-quality homes. 
The stylised model presented above disregards well-known beneficial effects of consumer 
choice, taking the number of high- and low-quality homes as given. A more realistic model would 
                                                 
8 A downward-sloping curve means that the number wishing to search falls as the number of representatives 
searching increases. Search costs increase as more representatives begin to search, and these costs outweigh the gain 
in terms of a higher quality difference. 12                                                                                                      Kari Eika 
take into account that well-informed consumers contribute to an increase in the proportion of 
high-quality homes. The proportion may rise even when it is difficult for consumers to observe 
quality, as long as low quality results in a bad reputation and if the loss in reputation, in turn, is 
sufficiently costly in terms of lower future demand and profits (Klein and Leffler, 1981). Limited 
consumer sovereignty dilutes such effects. First, residents‘ weak voice limits the information flow 
in the market, thus weakening the effect of quality on a firm‘s future reputation (cf. Tables 1 and 
2). Second, residents without representatives cannot use quality information, and that in turn 
weakens the link between reputation and demand. 
The demand for a nursing home place has been viewed as a one-time purchase because 
of high moving costs, following Hirth (1999). Conversely, if exit is not an exceptionally costly 
option, the effect of consumer choice on the systematic sorting of residents, and hence on quality 
differences, would be faster. Because a representative monitoring service quality is likely to gain 
more information about quality after a resident has moved into a home, quality differences may 
also increase. The more accurate the information, the more systematic the sorting of residents. 
We have not considered the political implications of resident sorting. Residents without 
representatives have a weak voice in the political sphere and in the market. Therefore, sorting 
may weaken the political pressure to improve quality because there will be fewer committed 
representatives in poor homes to serve as watchdogs, contributing to political pressure to 
improve conditions. 
Finally, the information assumptions are worth comment. A telling illustration of the 
costs of searching and the type of information that can be obtained is the Consumer guide to choosing 
a nursing home.
9 It is written by the American advocacy group, the National Citizens‘ Coalition for 
Nursing Home Reform. The guide is addressed to individuals seeking a nursing home on behalf 
of a ‗loved one‘. The reader should consider the information published by the authorities (such as 
staffing, ownership and other nursing home characteristics, standardised quality measures, and 
reported deficiencies in state inspections). The guide advises the reader to consult a public 
ombudsman and advocacy groups, then to check the reputation of the homes (consulting friends, 
family, and clergy, among others), and finally to visit the homes under consideration, preferably 
as many as possible. Readers are advised to take the time to sit and observe interaction, to ‗speak 
with residents and their family members to get a full understanding of the life in the home‘, and 
to visit homes a second and third time, also during evenings and weekends. This process is costly, 
requires time and physical resources, and also requires personal skills. Time and personal costs 
are likely to vary; representatives who are old and frail themselves may have low time costs but 
large effort costs. 
The information is incomplete and judgmental. The guide warns that nursing homes may 
not have satisfactory quality even if public surveyors have not detected any regulatory violations. 
The guide advises representatives, who visit a home on behalf of a prospective resident, to use 
‗your senses—sight, hearing, smell, touch‘; considering factors such as: ‗Is there cheerful, 
respectful, pleasant, and warm interaction among staff and residents?‘ ‗Do they enjoy their work?‘ 
This information is clearly unverifiable. It is intangible and highly judgmental. To protect public 
accountability, especially when provider competition on equal terms is a policy objective, a public 
employee, choosing a home for a group 1 resident, may not be in a position to use this type of 
information. 
 
4. Consumer choice in social care 
Are nursing home residents able to discipline the market? Only a minority of nursing home 
residents  are  without  cognitive  impairments.  The  discussion  in  Section  2  suggests  that  even 
residents with sufficient cognitive resources may be reluctant to exercise agency, either because 
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they do not have the physical resources or because they do not wish to. Some may feel too 
dependent on their care givers for help, and for social support and fulfilment, to be willing to 
leave a familiar environment or to express dissatisfaction. In short, even cognitively able residents 
may have lost their autonomy as consumers. 
Residents often have a relative or friend who may act as a representative, although as the 
data in Section 3 indicate, a significant minority do not. Moreover, representatives have lives of 
their own; they may have the capacity to obtain comprehensive information yet exert less effort 
in searching and monitoring than they would if they were residents themselves. From the point 
of view of self-interest, this behaviour may be fully rational. When Chou (2002) found that 42 per 
cent of residents did not have a representative looking after them, he used a liberal measure of 
representative involvement. To ease the transition to a nursing home, residents may have an 
urgent need for assistance by representatives immediately after entry; e.g., to communicate needs 
and preferences, and a month is a long time in this regard. Moreover, the proportion of residents 
who receive at least monthly visits by their representative(s) (which would be a liberal measure of 
monitoring intensity) may be even smaller. 
The question remains whether the rational response of a fraction of consumers—rational 
in the sense that their demand is sensitive to quality (and to price if they pay out of their own 
pockets)—is sufficient to discipline firms. From the discussion in Section 3, we may conclude 
that the search by committed representatives strengthens the discipline of some firms; notably, 
nursing homes that from the outset are attractive. They are disciplined in particular because the 
increased sorting of residents in the market strengthens monitoring by representatives in these 
homes. On the other hand, it is not clear whether competitive forces increase or decrease quality 
in homes with problematic quality. There are two counteracting effects. The sorting of residents 
reduces monitoring and thus contributes to lower quality. This instability caused by the influence 
of representatives—improving and lowering the quality of respectively good and poor 
providers—was pointed out by Hirschman (1970) for the case of public schools. When public 
schools deteriorate, the most aware and informed parents may choose ―exit‖, thus cease to 
influence the public schools.  
However, poor homes may be driven out of business or forced to improve quality to 
survive. The latter effect is weaker when there is lower excess capacity and a lower proportion of 
residents who have involved representatives in the market. As previously argued, many 
unrepresented residents not only may be insensitive to provider quality but also cannot 
contribute to the forming of provider reputations because of their weak voice. 
Whether average quality in the market increases or decreases is an empirical question. 
Answering it is beyond the scope of this paper, but insights about the forces underlying demand 
may be gained from previous studies. For the USA, Nyman (1989), who only examines demand 
from self-paying residents, reports a strong negative price elasticity of demand (his main estimate 
is –1.7) but statistically insignificant effects of quality (in his preferred 2SLS equation). He 
suggests that the latter may be explained by poor data on quality. Hirth et al. (2003) find transfers 
between nursing homes to be positively correlated with quality but with relatively weak effects. 
Poor data for care quality notwithstanding, strong price responsiveness and less clear effects of 
quality are reconcilable with limited consumer sovereignty. Representatives are often heirs of the 
residents, and strong price elasticity may in part reflect representatives‘ incentives to protect their 
expected heritage. 
The key issue is the response to quality. With full consumer sovereignty, there should be 
strong quality responsiveness because quality of nursing home care is vital to quality of life.
10  
Representatives, on the other hand, are not personally affected by quality, and weaker effects of 
quality are to be expected. 
                                                 
10Both papers use the number of regulatory violations as a measure of quality. This is public information. If this 
variable is considered to be a reasonable indicator of quality by those making demand decisions, it is reasonable to 
expect that the estimated effects of quality is significant in large data sets. 14                                                                                                      Kari Eika 
Although limited consumer sovereignty literally violates the conventional consumer 
rationality assumption (Nyman, 1989), it does not imply that market behaviour is erratic or 
irrational. When autonomy is lost, the question is rather: whose interests underlie demand 
decisions? Is it the interests of the residents or any agents assisting them or making decisions on 
their behalf? Depending on the situation, these agents may be friends, family or guardians 
representing individual residents, or public purchasers or care providers. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
My  objective  has  been  to  show  that  the  aggregate  effects  of  consumer  choice  may  not  be 
unambiguously  favourable;  the  quality  delivered  by  the  least  attractive  care  providers  may 
deteriorate. In short, there are both gains and potential costs from user choice arrangements. It is 
equally important to stress that these costs are not fixed. Public regulation may compensate for 
weaknesses resulting from uncoordinated choices in the market. When representation is weak, 
limited consumer sovereignty justifies direct public intervention, such as setting minimum quality 
standards,  public  monitoring  and  enforcement.  It  may  be  difficult  for  public  supervisors  to 
identify homes with problematic quality. Here the choices of the well-informed may be useful. 
Are there some homes from which exits are more frequent? What are the reasons that residents 
(representatives) give for wishing to change to another nursing home? Such information becomes 
available  when  consumer  choice  is  possible,  and  it  may  be  used  in  addition  to  complaint 
information. 
Governments are involved in social care because of a concern for disadvantaged 
individuals. The success of policies should be judged (at least to some extent) by its effect on 
those most disadvantaged—in the context of this paper, by the effect on individuals without 
representatives and individuals receiving care from the least attractive care providers. 
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